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The paper “Regional incentives and patient cross-border mobility” received three commentaries, each adopting a different perspective on patients’ mobility issue. 
Starting with Neri,1 the author deeply examines the paper, 
by considering and commenting each step of the analysis. 
He notably addresses the main points of the manuscript, 
highlighting the importance of the institutional framework 
in which the cross-border mobility (CBM) is considered, and 
focusing on both the regional strategic incentives and the 
entrepreneurial behavior of private providers. Unquestionably, 
the institutional setting plays a main role in the analysis of CBM: 
the Italian National Health Service (NHS) is characterized by 
patients’ free choice, a decentralized healthcare system based 
on regional financial autonomy, Diagnosis-related group 
(DRG) tariffs for hospital services and the co-presence of 
private and public accredited hospitals, both contracting 
with regional authorities in order to plan admissions and be 
funded for them.2-4 Another feature of the Italian NHS is the 
different ability shown respectively by Northern and Southern 
regions in implementing a well-provided Regional Health 
Service (RHS), as Neri correctly addresses with appropriate 
references.5 In such a context it happens that some regions, 
namely the ones which accredited better endowed hospitals, 
may take advantage of this situation, not only to respond to 
resident demands and needs, but also to balance their budget, 
attracting patients from cross-border. The purchaser-provider 
contracts implemented with the quasi-market setting of the 
Italian NHS (1992-1993 reforms), facilitate these strategies, 
but, as Neri points out, their role is largely undervalued 
in the current analysis of the CBM phenomenon. Equally 
undervalued in the extant literature on the Italian CBM – a 
part from some exceptions6 – are the stronger incentives for 
entrepreneurial and opportunistic behaviors standing for 
private hospitals compared to public ones. As Neri suggests, 
this topic deserves more investigation, and I agree on the 
usefulness of qualitative methods (“interviews to regional 
ministers and managers, private providers and any other 
subjects who could lead to a better understanding of drivers, 
features and consequences of patient mobility”), in order to 
corroborate the hypothesis of our analysis. I also agree with 
Neri when he indicates the absence of a central government 
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during the accreditation of public and private providers 
(between 1992 and 1999), as a cause of territorial inequalities 
in healthcare access, according to a South–North divide. For 
these reasons, a more active role of the Italian Ministry of 
Health (MoH) in managing the mobility phenomenon and 
in leveling healthcare inequalities between South and North, 
represents a crucial measure to be implemented. Without it, 
possible solutions to avoid inappropriate CBM mobility are 
left up to the collaborative behaviors among single regions. 
To this regard, as Olivadoti and Cislaghi7 point out, some 
regions autonomously enacted interregional agreements in 
order to contain and control the annual patients’ flow. The 
commentary of these two authors provides a brief insight on 
the Italian CBM topic, which represents a useful integration 
of our paper. In particular, the following points deserve 
consideration. In point 3 of the commentary, the authors 
address the Italian regions’ heterogeneity in shape and size 
as an important variable in CBM analysis: especially for little 
regions or for patients living near the borders, “boundary 
mobility” is somehow a structural phenomenon and has to 
be considered separately in the analysis (as we actually did). 
Another interesting aspect emerging from Olivadoti and 
Cislaghi’s commentaries refers to the fact that some people 
actually live in a region (mainly for study or job motivation), 
but maintain the residence in the native region (point 6 of 
Olivadoti and Cislaghi). In this case, the choice to be admitted 
in the region where a patient is domiciled is not due to a 
perceived better quality of care, but to practical aspects. Surely 
this issue warrants more investigation, in particular when 
examining mobility of people that choose to be hospitalized 
in regions where progeny, parents or other relatives live. 
Notwithstanding these considerations on patient choice, 
the financial question, namely the monetary flow following 
people admitted outside their resident border, stands. The 
two authors also correctly highlight the unequal allocation of 
resources among regions due to patients’ migration within the 
Italian NHS; and produce some commentaries on the private/
public hospital choice by patients too. With regard to this 
last point, in our analysis we only considered admissions in 
hospitals accredited by the NHS, which means both private 
and public hospitals, recognized and paid by the NHS. Within 
our sample, we could indeed observe the patients’ preference 
toward public/private structures, thanks to the availability of 
data provided directly by the MoH. Finally, the suggestion 
of introducing a co-payment to disincentive individual 
mobility represents an interesting solution that deserves more 
investigation, in order to preserve equity within the Italian 
NHS. 
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The third commentary, by Legido-Quigley,8 discusses the issue 
of universal health coverage within member States. It mentions 
Brenna and Spandonaro analysis at the very beginning, and 
subsequently opens a debate on free healthcare access within 
European States. Although this topic is undoubtedly a very 
interesting one, it goes far beyond the aims of our study, so 
I will be glad to consider and comment it in other possible 
circumstances.
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